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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sanja Rose appeals from her judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin. She 
pleaded guilty, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with 
three years fixed. Ms. Rose subsequently filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, 
which was denied. Ms. Rose now appeals, and she asserts that the district court erred 
by denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Rose was charged by indictment with aiding and abetting the trafficking in 
heroin, I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(6); 18-204. (R., p.6.) This crime carries a mandatory 
minimum of three years fixed. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6)(A). 
Ms. Rose pleaded guilty and the State agreed to dismiss charges in a separate 
case. (R., p.48.) While Ms. Rose was warned of the mandatory minimum when she 
entered her plea, at sentencing, counsel argued that the mandatory minimum did not 
have to be served in the custody of the state board of correction. (8/2/13 Tr., p.38, Ls.3-
6.) Counsel asserted that, because I.C. § 37-2739A (another statute governing 
mandatory minimums), specified that sentences imposed pursuant to that statute be 
served in the "custody of the state board of correction" and I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(G)(A) 
stated only that the term be fixed, the court had discretion to place Ms. Rose on 
probation. (8/2/13 Tr., p.36, L.1 - p.38, L.6.) As a result, counsel asserted that 
Ms. Rose was a candidate for intensive, long-term treatment. (8/2/13 Tr., p.35, Ls.14-
19.) Specifically, counsel argued: 
What I was going to recommend, and pursuant to the negotiations with the 
State is that I would respectfully respond to that question [what authority 
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the court had to not execute her sentence] by saying that you could 
sentence her to a period of three years fixed, two indeterminate would be 
my recommendation for an aggregate sentence of five years, with the 
defendant being placed on five years supervised probation with the 
special condition that she successfully complete three years of inpatient 
treatment at a secure facility. 
(8/2/13 Tr., p.39, Ls.7-18.) The district court rejected this argument, holding that it 
lacked jurisdiction to sentence Ms. Rose to anything less than the mandatory minimum 
of three years fixed. (8/2/13 Tr., p.44, Ls.15-25.) The court then imposed a unified 
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., p.63.) Ms. Rose timely appealed. 
(R., p.74.) 
Ms. Rose, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to withdraw her 
plea. (R., p.84.) She asserted that, while she knew that there was a three-year 
mandatory minimum, she believed that she could still be placed on probation. (R., 
p.87.) She also asserted that her prior attorney told her that she was likely going to get 
a rider, with 8 to 11 months of prison time, and that she could be placed on probation if 
she performed well on the rider. (R., p.87.) At no point did she believe that the 
mandatory minimum required her to serve three years in prison. (R., p.87.) 
The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Ms. Rose testified that her 
prior counsel told her that she would likely get probation or drug court. (1/17/14 Tr., 
p.15, Ls.17-20.) After she was informed of the mandatory minimum when she pied, she 
had subsequent discussions with her attorney, and, 
In my understanding I thought that Judge Hansen would have retained 
jurisdiction still over me, and we talked a lot about me getting a rider 
possibly. At worst case scenario he said TC or something like that, and 
the Matter, Inc. program we looked into which was an inpatient treatment, 
rehab. 
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But I thought that Judge Hansen would still have retained jurisdiction over 
me. And then if I were to mess up or use or something like that, then in 
that case I would more severe consequences. 
(1/17/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.5-16.) She believed she still had an opportunity at probation. 
(1/17/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.17-19.) On cross-examination, Ms. Rose acknowledged that she 
had been informed several times that there was a mandatory minimum, but still 
asserted that she believed that the court could still retain jurisdiction or order TC or drug 
court. (1/17/14 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-8.) 
Ms. Rose's prior attorney also testified at the hearing. He stated that he told 
Ms. Rose that the judge did not have discretion with the mandatory minimum. (1/17/14 
Tr., p.58, Ls.1 1.) Later, when they discussed the mandatory minimum, Ms. Rose 
"begged" him for anything he could do, and he "came up with the most creative 
argument that [he] could." (1/17/14 Tr., p.65, Ls.8-13.) He eventually told her that this 
argument was "an extreme long shot, basically a Hail Mary. We talked about what a 
Hail Mary is. I remember that because she didn't understand the reference." (1/17/14 
Tr., p.66, Ls.6-9.) Counsel explained: "A Hail Mary is a pass that is thrown at the end of 
the game when you feel like you have nothing to lose. Basically the game is over and 
there is one in a billion chance that you can do something to overcome the odds and 
prevail." (1/17/14 Tr., p.66, Ls.12-17.) 
On cross-examination counsel testified that he told Ms. Rose that there was no 
opportunity for probation or a rider, but still acknowledged that he informed her of his 
"Hail Mary" argument. (1 /17/14 Tr., p.70, Ls.1-23.) Counsel acknowledged that "Hail 
Mary" can be successful, but he stated that he did not phrase this in terms of anything 
that had a likelihood of success. (1/17/14 Tr., p.71, Ls.6-10.) 
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district court denied the motion. (Memorandum and Order Concerning 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.)1 Ms. Rose that the court 
abused discretion by denying the motion to withdraw her plea. 
1 This order was received by this Court on May 5, 2014. 
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Did the district court abuse 
her plea? 
ISSUE 
discretion when it denied Ms. Rose's motion to withdraw 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Rose's Motion To 
Withdraw Her Plea 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Rose asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her 
motions to withdraw her plea because she demonstrated manifest injustice. 
Specifically, she asserts that she pleaded guilty under the false impression that she 
could avoid the mandatory minimum of three years fixed. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Laws 
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in 
the discretion of the trial court. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is, therefore, limited to 
whether the district court abused its discretion. Id. When evaluating a claim that the 
trial court has abused its discretion, the sequence of inquiry is: first, whether the district 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; second, whether the district 
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and finally, whether the 
district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., 
Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 ). If the plea is 
legally defective, relief must be granted. Conversely, if the plea has been made 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, it usually cannot be withdrawn after sentencing. 
State v. Simons, 112 Idaho 254, 731 P.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c), a plea may be withdrawn after sentencing only to 
correct a manifest injustice. The defendant has the burden of demonstrating this 
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manifest injustice. v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411 (Ct An 
abridgement of a constitutional right is deemed a manifest injustice as a matter 
Id. 
A reviewing court determines whether a guilty plea is entered voluntarily and 
knowingly through a three-part inquiry involving: 
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; 
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty. 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993). Ms. Rose asserts that the district court erred 
because she did not fully understand the consequences of pleading guilty. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Rose's Motion To 
Withdraw Her Plea 
The district court made the following factual findings in its order denying 
Ms. Rose's motion: 
At the evidentiary hearing Ms. Rose testified in summary fashion that her 
attorney told her that she might get probation or a retained jurisdiction. 
The state introduced transcripts of arraignment and plea hearings at which 
Ms. Rose was advised by various judges on numerous occasions that the 
trafficking charge against her carried with it a mandatory minimum 
sentence of three years fixed and that the sentence could be extended to 
life. No judge or anyone else in court ever suggested to her that she would 
receive probation, drug court, or a retained jurisdiction. 
Mr. Fox testified that he tried without success to get the prosecutor to 
reduce the charge to a crime that did not have a mandatory minimum. He 
was only able to obtain dismissal of other drug-delivery felonies and a 
recommendation of a sentence of three years fixed and five years 
indeterminate. He told Ms. Rose in no uncertain terms that the chance of 
getting probation, drug court, or a retained jurisdiction was virtually nil. 
Nevertheless, he did tell her that he would try a "Hail Mary" type of 
argument to convince the judge that Ms. Rose should receive something 
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other than the fixed mandatory minimum. 
Mr. argued strenuously but unavailingly 
minimum sentence. Judge Hansen 
fixed and four years indeterminate. 
hearing 
imposition of a 
of three 
(Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
pp.2-3.) The court concluded that Ms. Rose's claim that she did not know that he would 
have received a fixed term of at least three years "flies in the face of reality." 
(Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.3.) 
Thus, the court concluded that Ms. Rose's plea was entering knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently. (Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea, p.3.) 
Ms. Rose respectfully submits that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying her guilty plea. Specifically, she asserts that the court failed to reach its 
decision through an exercise of reason. Ms. Rose does not dispute, as found by the 
district court, that the judge informed Ms. Rose that she faced a mandatory minimum of 
three years fixed. This, however, does not end the analysis, because, as the district 
court also found, counsel informed Ms. Rose that he had come up with a "Hail Mary" 
argument to attempt to avoid the mandatory minimum. Thus, counsel was informing 
Ms. Rose that the court might be wrong when it informed her that she would face the 
mandatory minimum of three years fixed. A "Hail Mary," by definition, has a chance of 
success, as counsel acknowledged. (1/17/14 Tr., p.71, Ls.6-7.) Thus, the record 
shows that, regardless of the advice given to Ms. Rose by the court, her attorney 
informed her that he had an argument that the mandatory minimum could be avoided. 
And counsel, in fact, made this argument at the sentencing hearing. 
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Thus, Rose's assertions that she believed that she could a 
jurisdiction or program were reasonable. Her attorney argued court that 
this was a possibility. Her attorney admitted that he told her he would make this "Hail 
Mary" argument. However, the proper legal advice would have been that there was 
absolutely no way to avoid the mandatory minimum. The "Hail Mary" argument was 
completely frivolous and should have been made to the court or discussed with 
Ms. Rose. 
The fact that Ms. Rose had previously been warned that she faced the 
mandatory minimum is of little significance when the evidence at the hearing 
established that her attorney told her that he would make an argument that could avoid 
it. Counsel told Ms. Rose that it was at least a possibility that the mandatory minimum 
could be avoided and counsel made this argument to the court at sentencing. Thus, the 
record establishes that Ms. Rose believed that she had at least some chance of 
avoiding three years fixed. Therefore, her plea was not knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily given. As a result, the district court therefore abused its discretion by 
denying her motion to withdraw that plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Rose respectfully requests that the district court's order denying her motion 
to withdraw her plea be reversed and her case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2014. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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